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1. Introduction 
The advantages of decentralization have beefi amply described in the literature on fiscal 
federalism (Oates, 1972, 2004). The main advantage is that decentralization allows a better 
match between the supply of public goods and locai preferences, thus improving the allocative 
efficiency of the public sector. This outcome requires that those who receive the benefits of 
public goods reside in the jurisdictions that provide them and thus finance them through the 
payment of locai taxes. In fact, the principle of fiscal equivalence implies that the electors 
coincide with the taxpayers. The result is an efficient supply of locai public goods that reflects 
the preferences and willingness of locai electors to pay. However, the equivalence between the 
administrative borders and the benefit area of locai public services is difficult to achieve in 
larger metropolitan areas characterized by high mobility. Metropolitan areas have been defined 
as territorial entities centred on a core city that attracts different populations from suburban 
communities for reasons of study, work and leisure. These populations therefore exploit the 
city's services without having to pay for them. This is a complex phenomenon that has 
profound implications for the fiscal health of ali of the municipalities within the metropolitan 
area. 
This paper is a preliminary study dealing with issues concerning the relationship between 
urban/metropolitan development and locai finance during a phase of growing fiscal autonomy. 
It draws mainly on evidence from the metropolitan area of Turin, Italy. In the first section, we 
attempt to apply the theory of the urban development cycle to the Italian case. In particular, 
we investigate whether the urban development process determines higher fiscal stress in 
centrai cities than in suburban municipalities. The second section deals with the issue of fiscal 
interdependency between centrai cities and suburban areas both from a theoretical and an 
applied point of view. We conclude with some suggestions for the development of a new 
model of locai finance in metropolitan areas. 
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2. Urban development and locai finance 
At the crux of the metropolitan issue is urban sprawl. A discussion of the criteria proposed by 
several disciplines for the definidon of the borders of a metropolitan area (socio-demographic 
citeria, commuting, etc.) goes beyond the scope of this paper. For our purposes we may 
simply refer to urban development theory and its possible consequences on locai finance: "In 
the urbanisation phase, population and economie activity eoncentrates in urban eentres.In the suburbanisarion 
phasethe growth of the suburbs outstripsthat of the city centre and,eventually, there is a shift of population and 
jobs to the suburbs.In the deurbanisation phase the wider conurbation as a whole losespopulation, smaller 
urban areas grow and a more decentralised urban system develops. In the reurbanisarion phase, cities which 
have been losingpopulation begin to grow again" (Commission of the European Communides, 1992J. 
Throughout these different stages, centrai cides condnue to attract people not only from the 
immediately oudying areas but also from more distant locations. The result is the presence of 
a heterogeneous populadon ranging from commuters to different types of city users 
(Mardnotd 1999, Nuvolati, 2002). This undermines the very foundations of the poli deal 
theory resdng on the assumpdon that locai government is made up of 'one populadon, one 
territory'. Yet the growing mobility of populadon implies not only the existence of more than 
one populadon per territory but also of more than one territory per populadon. 
These changes are bound to affect locai financing of centrai cides. But how and to what 
extent? American scholars (Oakland, 1979) have pointed to evidence from several large cides 
in the 70s and the 80s that the phases of deurbanizadon and suburbanizadon pose the risk for 
a vicious circle of progressive urban decline. This can corrode the economie and fìnancial 
condidons of a large number of centrai cides, while the suburban areas enjoy social-economic 
growth and better fiscal health instead. 
Several major cides in the United States have faced a number of fiscal challenges over the past 
fifteen years. At the root of the problem lies the shift of high and middle-income populations 
towards suburban areas. Added to this is industriai decline in the centrai cides, in terms of 
decreased industriai activity and employment, which is not counterbalanced by increased 
employment in the service sector. This causes a huge drop in the tax bases and revenues of 
centrai cides, which in turn leads to a decrease in expenditures and services unless these can be 
matched by increased fiscal pressure. 
At the same dme, centrai cities are experiencing an increase of social problems stemming from 
higher concentradons of poverty and unemployment (e.g., drugs, crime, social dependence). 
Thus, locai administrators are faced with diminishing tax-bases that are unable to keep pace 
with growing expenditure needs. Moreover, the services they offer are enjoyed not only by 
locai residents but also by residents from neighbouring locales, who "exploit" the centrai cides 
whenever they visit them for the purposes of work, study, leisure and shopping. Barring an 
increase in produedvity or drasdc reductions in services, increased fiscal pressure is the 
inevitable result. This further induces migradon of the wealthiest, leading to the perverse cycle 
underlying the current fiscal crisis in the largest American cides. In addidon, from a politicai 
stance, the constituency of the centrai cides is experiencing the growing influence of low and 
middle-income electors whose preference for redistribudve policies mainly weighs on the 
wealthiest. This creates further incentives for them to out-migrate. 
In sum, this model explains the mobility of cidzens and businesses in terms of fiscal 
motivation. It is marred by a number of limits, however. First, it does not contemplate a role 
for possible policies carried out against this process. Nor does it make allowance for 
produedvity increases to cover losses in tax bases. Moreover, it disregards other factors 
potendally affecdng mobility. Finally, this model is not well-suited for the Italian (and 
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probably European) context, where locai finance is characterized by limited recourse to 
income tax and by much lower levels of mobility. However, for the moment, no other models 
adequately capturing the relationship between urban development and the fiscal health of 
major cities in Italy have been proposed. 
Large cities play an important role in the Italian economy (RUR, 2004). The latest statistics 
reveal that, in 2000, the nine metropolitan areas established by Locai Government Law (D.Lgs 
n. 267/2000), accounted for twenty-two per cent of the whole population and represented 
almost thirty per cent of the GNP. The administrative capacity of metropolitan areas is thus a 
criticai factor in granting the competitiveness of the entire Italian economy. 
Over the last thirty years, Italian metropolitan areas have faced a shift in population from 
centrai cities to suburban areas according to the urban development model oudined above. 
Two questions arise: 
i) to what extent has urban development affected the fiscal capacity of centrai cities; and 
ii) to what extent has urban development generated fiscal externalides between centrai cities 
and neighbouring locales, or, in other words, what is the burden of non-residents on the 
centrai cides? 
The answer to these questions may provide several insdtudonal soludons that allow 
metropolitan areas to furnish more efficient public services and to promote locai economie 
development. 
In this paper, these two issues are dealt with in reference to the metropolitan area of Turin 
(Italy), and more specifically, to two areas previously defined by IRES (Fig. 1). The first 
corresponds to an administrative jurisdiction defined by the regional government in 1972 
which comprises Turin and the 52 bordering communes contained in the two rings outside 
Turin. 
The second is composed of the 56 communes bordering the first two rings. According to the 
latest demographic data, the metropolitana area of Turin area has experienced the different 
stages of urban growth (Fig. 2) and has now reached the stage of deurbanizadon, with some 
Figure 1 - Different borders of the metropolitan area of Turin 
"Turin Metropolitan Area" 
/ Q 
T n 
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Figure 2 - The urban development cycle in Turin: 1971-2001 
10.0 
-10.0 
-15,0 
-20.0 
Turin First ring Second ring Third ring Total 
• 71-'81 -4.4 10.7 23.4 12,8 
2.9 
• 81-91 -15.9 6.4 4.5 ,1.4 
-5.3 
• 9V01 -10,2 1.7 2.9 7,5 
-3,9 
Source: ISTAT. 
Figure 3 - Share of tertiary employment in the metropolitana area of Turin: 1981-2001 
First ring Second ring Third ring 53 Communes area 
Source: ISTAT. 
evidence of reurbanizadon. This has been accompanied by a shift from an industriai economie 
base to a service oriented economy. Discussion of terdarizadon risks being meaningless, 
unless we speli out its main features in a specific context. In the Turin area, the service sector 
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is strongly tied to the city's industriai structure and is therefore characterized by high value 
added components. 
The 2001 Census indicated that the service sector made up 71 per cent of total employment in 
the metropolitan area (covering both areas previously defined), although Turin accounts for a 
significant pordon of this, with an 81 per cent share (Fig. 3). 
This reflects a decline in industriai employment from 408,000 in 1981 to 208,000 employees 
in 2001. The share of industriai jobs in the 53 communes area slid from 82 to 35 per cent in 
2001 (Fig. 4). 
Figure 4 - Share of industriai employment in the metropolitan area of Turin: (56 communes) 
1951-2001 
70,0 -
Source: ISTAT. 
Total employment declined by 3 per cent between 1991 and 2001 as a consequence of the 
nearly 50 per cent drop in industriai employment (from about 140,000 to 70,000 employees) 
which was not matched by an equal increase in the service sector (which grew only from about 
277,000 to 340,000 employees). In general, however, the decline in populadon from 1981 to 
2001 (about 252,000 residents) was more significant than the loss of jobs (about 62,000 
employees). This disparity in the growth of population and employment underlines the 
increasing separation of people's places of residence, work and leisure. At the same time, it 
may also have caused a change in the tax-base of the municipalities located in the area. For 
example, a number of industriai areas have been converted into residential neighbourhoods or 
commercial zones, influencing the value added produced as well as real estate value. 
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3. The fiscal health of large cities 
3.1 How to measure fiscal health 
The effects of the different stages of urban development on fiscal equilibrium are difficult to 
evaluate. First of ali, it is difficult to come up with an adequate definition of the concept of 
fiscal equilibrium. 
American scholars use the term "fiscal health", which, however, does not refer to the mere 
matching between revenues and expenditures, but to the ability of locai governments to 
provide an adequate level of services by means of an average level of fiscal pressure and user 
charges. Two more precise definitions are: (i) the difference between the expenditure needs of 
a locai government and its ability to raise its own revenues (Reschovsky, 1997) and (ii) the 
ability of a locai government to furnish an average level of services with an average level of 
fiscal and non-fiscal effort (Ladd e Yinger, 1991). This sort of evaluation therefore requires an 
assessment of both fiscal capacity and expenditure needs. 
The following definition may suffice: fiscal capacity is the amount of tax revenues that a locai 
government can raise by applying an average tax rate to its different tax-bases. These resources 
are made up of contributions from both resident and non-resident tax -payers. For example, 
locai business taxes can affect non-residents via the well-known mechanism of fiscal incidence. 
At the same time, however, the growing mobility of the population within the metropolitan 
areas can lead to the use of locai public services by non-residents who do not contribute to 
financing them1. In fact, an individuai may reside in one jurisdiction, work in another and 
consume in yet another. The same individuai may be a taxpayer in the jurisdiction where he 
lives and votes, but also in other jurisdictions where he does not vote, for example, whenever 
he owns a property that is subject to locai tax. This leads to a number of problems in 
providing efficient locai public services and, more generally, in controlling externalities. The 
usuai approach (Chernick, 1998) to assessing fiscal capacity is referred to as the representative tax 
system (STR). This is calculated by applying a standard tax rate (t1=1 n) ) to the tax bases 
BIMPi=1 n throughout the jurisdiction. In general, the standard tax rates correspond to the 
simple or weighted average2 for every source of tax-revenue in the area under consideration 
(in this case the metropolitan area). 
Formally this can be represented as: 
n 
F C S T R = Lt,BIMP, 
i—1 
Obviously this is purely hypothetical in that not ali jurisdictions can apply the same tax rate. 
Despite its simplicity, this formula is stili not easy to calculate when we face several different 
types of locai taxes. Moreover (at least in Italy), data concerning the tax bases is almost always 
either missing, or incomplete and unreliable. As a consequence, one must refer to data on 
actual revenues, eliminadng the possibility of assessing the effective fiscal capacity of the locai 
government. 
Locai government expenditure needs are generally identified as the level of expenditure 
necessary to provide a standard level of service, taking into account only the external factors 
1 Unless the charges fully cover the costs. 
2 In the case of weighted average the weights correspond to the tax bases of the various locai governments. In 
this case the choice implies a more unified view of the area under consideration. 
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beyond its control. Yet reliable measures of centrai cities' expenditure needs are not available 
for Italian metropolitan areas. 
Figure 5 - Index-numbers of per-capita current expenditures in the metropolitan communes 
compared with per capita current expenditures of the other communes in Italy (1982-2004) 
- -
_ 
r — r t 
ly = -1.758* + 199,151 | R* = 0.5841 | 
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 
Source: IRES calculations on ISTAT data. 
The only possible measure of fiscal health is the difference between fiscal capacity and need, 
commonly known as "fiscal gap". 
Lacking such information, the fiscal health of large cities can only be indirectly evaluated by 
comparing their per-capita current expenditures with that of the other municipalities by means 
of an index number. 
Although it offers only a rough estimate, this index shows overall deterioration in the fiscal 
health of the centrai cities (Fig. 5). 
3.2 Evidence from the Turin metropolitan area 
The fiscal disparities within the Turin metropolitan area can be assessed using three different 
sorts of data at the communal level: 
i) personal income tax base according to tax-payer residence from 1998 to 2000; 
ii) IRAP tax-base and net IRAP paid according to type and legai address of business; 
ili) budgets of communes containing the main categories of tax and non-tax revenues in 
terms of budgeted and actual revenues for the period 1998-2001. 
3.3 Personal income tax (IRPEF) 
With regards to personal income tax (IRPEF), the fiscal capacity of the centrai city continues to 
be much higher than in outlying areas. Per capita personal income tax in the commune of 
Turin in 1995 and 2000 was higher (Table 1) than both the average in the whole metropolitan 
area and the average in the two oudying rings (in this case by about ten per cent). However, 
this contrasts with data from some of the smallest communes dose to the centrai city, such as 
the "hill communes" in the first ring, and those defined by IRES as "dynamic hill communes". 
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Table 1 - Fiscal capacity (Personal income tax-base) of the centrai city and the rings in the 
metropolitan area of Turin 1995 e 2000 
Deviation from the average (index numbers) 
1995 2000 
Turin 111 112 
First ring 101 104 
Second ring 99 97 
Whole metropolitan area 100 100 
Hill Communes (average of three communes) 142 148 
Dynamic hill Communes 134 138 
Source: Ancitel, 2003. 
The tax base of the former is 36% higher than Turin's, and 48% higher than the whole 
metropolitan area, while in the latter areas the corresponding figures are 24% and 36%.But 
what are the fiscal effects deriving from redistribution of the population within the 
metropolitan area over the past twenty-five years? Unfortunately, the data available are scanty 
and inconsistent, based only on the distribution of taxpayers per tax bracket since 1995. 
Analysis of these data reveals that most members (66.3%) in the highest tax brackets (with an 
income of over 69,721 euro) resided in the centrai city. 
However, it is interesting to note that Turin also contains a higher number of members from 
the lowest tax brackets than the two surroundings rings (Table 2). 
Although the differences are slight - just a bit more than 3% overall - they may be 
symptomatic of an initial form of urban dualism, marked by the outflow of the middle classes 
from the centrai city. However, the phenomenon is by no means significant. 
Table 2 - Percentage of tax payers according to income bracket in ITL (2000) 
Tax base 
<=7746,84 
Tax base 
7747-15494 
Tax base 
15945-30897 
Tax base 
30898-69722 
Tax base 
>69722 
Total 
Turin 33,53 26,09 31,37 7,19 1,82 100 
First ring 30,66 28,25 33,69 6,21 1,19 100 
Second ring 32,17 29,00 31,87 5,92 1,04 100 
Total 32,45 27,16 32,15 6,71 1,52 100 
Source: Ancitel. 
3.4 Business tax (IRAP) 
Private IRAP data on tax base and revenues from businesses located in Piedmont1 are a 
valuable new source of fiscal information that makes it possible to evaluate the value added 
produced in the centrai city separately from that produced in the rings. These figures do not 
necessarily correspond to the actual value added produced in these areas because they reflect 
total production throughout Piemonte. However we can plausibly assume that most business-
tax payers (in particular, one-man companies, partnerships and non-commercial bodies) 
3 IRAP (imposta regionale sulle attività produttive) is a regional tax on productive acdvities which was introduced 
in 1998 to replace several formerly exisdng regional taxes. It is levied on companies, parterships and individuals 
carrying out business activity. The IRAP tax base is the value added (net of depreciation) produced in a region. In 
case a tax payer runs busieness activities in more than one region, the value added is apportioned according to 
the labor cost in each region. The uniform tax rate is 4.25 per cent. Banks aand insurance companies paid a 
higher rate until 2006, while agricultural businesses pay a reduced rate. Regions are entided to vary the tax rate up 
or down to 1 per cent and to differenriate tax rates for certain types of businesses within these limits. 
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operate only inside the metropolitan area. In addition, IRAP data for the others (corporations) 
are tied to the distribudon of the fiscal capacity inside the metropolitan area. Figure 6 shows 
that the rado in Turin between tax base and the number of tax declaradons, which can be 
considered a proxy of the producdve potendal, is almost doublé that of the second ring 
(169,000 euro vs. 87,000 euro). 
Figure 6 - IRAP tax base and IRAP paid per - declaradons in the different rings of the 
metropolitan area of Turin 
First ring Second ring Total metropolitan E 
• Tax base/ number of tax declarations —a— IRAP/ number of tax declarations 1 
Source: IRES calculations on the basis of 2000 IRAP declarations on 1999 income. Private IRAP only. 
Figures in thousand of euro. 
Figure 7 - IRAP per capita tax base in the metropolitan area of Turin by locadon 
16.000 
12.000 
Turin First ring Second ring Total metropolitan arca 
Source: IRES calculations on the basis of 2000 IRAP declarations on 1999 income. Private IRAP only. 
Figures in euro. 
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The IRAP paid per declaration is even more than doublé: 7,500 euro vs. 3,700 euro, with an 
implicit tax rate of 4.45% (4.19% in the second ring), which is slightly higher than the 
established rate of 4.25%. The amount of IRAP value added that was declared per resident is 
therefore about 15,000 euro in the Commune of Turin as opposed to 7,400 euro in the first 
ring and 7,200 euro in the second (Fig. 7). 
These data also confirm the greater fiscal capacity of the centrai city in relation to suburban 
areas stemming from greater employment (residents and non residents) in high value added 
sectors. 
3.5 Tax revenues of Communes in the metropolitan area 
An analysis based on the Communes' budgets alone permits only comparison of actual 
revenues and not of fiscal capacity as defined above. Yet the information this provides is stili 
significant in relative terms. Fiscal pressure as measured by per-capita tax revenue is higher in 
the metropolitan area than in the rest of Piedmont (Table 3). In 2001 per capita tax revenue 
was 14 per cent higher than the average in Piedmont, while it is the non- metropolitan 
communes that show higher current and capital transfers. 
Among the different tax revenues per- capita property tax (lei), which yields the largest 
revenue, was 12 per cent higher than the average in Piedmont in 2001, although this difference 
seems to be decreasing. Instead the average value in the two rings has remained almost the 
same as in the rest of Piedmont. This may be due to an increased assessment capacity of the 
non metropolitan piedmontese communes in addition to growth of the tax base and tax rates 
in some communes (e.g. residential sprawl and business development). The commune of 
Turin alone had a per capita le i assessment that was 55 per cent greater than the average in 
non-metropolitan communes. The next most important source of tax revenue is garbage tax 
(TARSU), which does not vary very much between the whole metropolitan area and the rest of 
Piedmont. In this case too, however, the per-capita garbage tax assessement in the Commune 
of Turin is 50 per cent higher than the average in the other piedmontese communes and is 
also 30 per cent higher than in the rings. Finally, per-capita non-tax revenues are consistendy 
lower than in the rest of Piedmont. 
This data reveails a different performance between the Commune of Turin (283 euro per 
capita, nearly the doublé than the average in Piedmont) and the rings (91 euro). 
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Table 3. Per-capita revenues of communes in the metropolitan area of Turin and in the rest 
of Piedmont (euro) 
Revenues 
Metropolitan area 
(Turin included) 
Resto/ 
Piedmont Turin 
Rings 
(le II) 
2001 2001 2001 2001 
Tax revenues (Title I) 298 260 380 296 
Property tax (lei) 180 160 247 179 
Garbage tax (TARSU) 68 60 90 68 
Transfers (Title II) 134 258 591 125 
Non-tax revenues ( M e IH) 95 154 283 91 
Capital revenues (Title IV) 181 658 309 179 
Loans (Title V) 57 102 237 53 
Current expenditures 500 595 1241 486 
Capital expenditures 
650 214 (average 1998-2001) 223 528 
Source: Osservatorio sulla finanza locale IRES. Per capita assessments at Constant prices 1995 . 
In terms of fiscal effort ther is no significant difference within the metropolitan area. 
Average tax rates are only slighdy lower in the first (5.91 per thousand of the assessed value) 
and in the second ring (5.94 per thousand) than in Turin (6.0 per thousand). 
The greater fiscal needs of the centrai city are met by higher real estate value in Turin. 
Moreover, even per capita transfers from higher levels of government in 2001 were much 
higher to Turin (521 euro) than in the rings (125 euro), compared with a middle value to the 
rest of Piedmont (258 euro). 
Per-capita current expenditures in Turin in 2001 were 70 per cent higher than the non 
metropolitan average and higher stili than the rings. This is due to the higher fiscal needs of 
centrai cities in metropolitan areas explained by scholars: greater number of services provided 
(ii) higher unitary costs of services and (iii) the effects of greater mobility which is tied to 
positive spill-over towards the communes. 
The next section of the paper discusses this issue. 
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4. Fiscal interdependencies between centrai cities and rings: the case 
of Turin 
4.1 Issues and methodology 
As seen from the data presented in the previous sections, Turin does not show any decline in 
fiscal capacity. However, we cannot assess the fiscal health of the centrai city since we lack 
any precise data on fiscal needs. What is clear is that the city faces extra- fiscal needs due to 
externalities between the centrai city and the rings. The residents of the latter can exploit the 
centrai city by using its services for the purposes of work and leisure time activities. This is 
true independently of the the vicious circle of urban decline discussed above. Therefore, an 
adequate approach to locai finance requires analysis of the non-resident users of the city's 
services to fairly assess its fiscal health. 
Such analysis should assess the net incidence of the non resident population on the centrai city 
in different expenditure sectorrs, adopting a similar appproach to that of recent research 
conducted on the Commune of Milano (Bernareggi, 2004a and 2004b). 
This requires identification of different populations which use centrai city services as well as of 
the different kinds of services provided, based on their degree of publicness. 
This should allow estimation of non resident use of centrai city services at no charge, that is, 
of their positive externalities. In any case, it must be stressed that this is only a partial 
equilibrium analysis and does not take into account the overall effect of the non resident 
population on the centrai city in terms of value added and employment.The ecomentric tools 
required are too complex to be considered here. 
4.2 The different populations 
Ther are three types of populations that use city services. The first are registered residents of 
the city, who have voting rights and tax duties in the city and therefore determine the demand 
for locai public services. The second are non-registered populations who live in the coomune, 
although they are officially registered in another commune or abroad. They can be defined as 
"non-resident inhabitants" similarly to Bernareggi's definition (quoted). The last population to 
be considered are daily and occasionai commuters who travel to the city for various reasons 
(work, leisure, etc.) where they use the city services. Ther is a basic distinction between the 
registered and the non-registered populations. The former, even if they spend periods of time 
away from the city, by definition vote and pay locai taxes. The latter does not have the right to 
vote althogh they may pay locai taxes including property tax (lei) if they own property, refuse 
removal tax (TARSU) and electricity consumption surcharge for renters4. 
It is easy to quantify the resident population by consulting the public registry (867,857 
inhabitants in 2003). However this is more difficult for non-residents, particularly in the 
absence of direct surveys aimed at estimating their number and assessing their use of the 
different locai services. For this study we have estimated the non-resident populations to be 
46,728 non-resident inhabitants (that is 5.7% of the resident population), and 368,000 daily 
and occasionai commuters. This is an addition to the 868,000 residents in 2003. However, 
these figures must be weighted according to a discounted factor determined by the actual 
time spent in the centrai city. Therefore the absolute values are discounted and translated into 
equivalent values according to the hypoteheses described in the Appendix in order to 
determine a standardized value in terms of days' presence per year. 
4 We will disregard any possibile incidence of property tax (lei) on renters. 
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Tab/e 4 - Non-resident population: number of non-residents according to the Census data 
Reasons of preseme in the lodging 
Ho/iday Work Study 
Presente of 
relatives Other 
Total 
Length of stay = from 91 to 180 days 
Discounted factor 0.37 ' 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 
Turin 187 2,196 1,428 2,983 1,483 8,277 
Equivalent population 69 812 528 1,103 549 3,061 
ÌMgtb of stay =from 181 to 270 days 
Discounted factor 0.618 0.618 0.618 0.618 0.618 0.618 
Turin 123 2,278 2,090 1,635 853 6,979 
Equivalent population 76 1,407 10,1291 1,010 527 4,312 
Ijengtb of stay = from 271 to 365 days. 
Discounted factor 0.871 0.871 0.871 0.871 0.871 0.871 
Turin 23 2,816 1,489 2,975 2,090 9,393 
Equivalent population 20 2,453 1,297 2,592 1,821 8,183 
Total equivalent population 165 4,672 3,116 4,705 2,897 15,556 
Table 5 - Non resident population: cohabitations (Source: Census of Pop) 
„ . Number of Discounting Equivalent 
Type of community factor value 
SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES (a) 1 ,334 1 . 056 1 ,409 
ASYLUMS (a) 1 ,619 1 . 056 1 , 710 
°Reformatories 2 6 5 1 . 056 2 8 0 
°01d Peoples Homes and Long-Term Hospices 4 0 1 1 . 056 4 2 3 
°Immigrant Asylums 2 2 2 1 .056 2 3 4 
°Others 731 1 . 056 7 7 2 
HOSPITALS (a) 5 , 131 1 . 0 5 6 5 , 4 1 8 
"Public 4 , 7 5 3 1 . 056 4 , 7 5 3 
"Pivate 3 7 8 1 .056 3 7 8 
PRISONS (a) 7 1 .056 7 
RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES (a) 332 0 . 9 5 2 3 1 6 
HOTELS, BOARDINGHOUSES, INNS, ETC. (a) (b) 81 0 . 9 5 2 7 7 
OTHF.RS (a) (C) 3 , 324 0 . 9 5 2 3 1 6 4 
Total (a) 1 1 , 8 2 8 1 , 3810 
Inmates (Prisons) (d) 1 ,462 1 .056 1 , 544 
Hotel guests (ali motives) (e) 4 , 8 5 0 1 . 056 5 , 1 2 2 
Vagrants (f) 1 ,500 1 . 056 1 ,584 
Gipsies 2 , 4 3 9 1 . 056 2 , 5 7 6 
Ali Population with Lodging 2 2 , 0 7 9 2 4 , 6 3 6 
(a) Source: ISTAT-CENSUS o f population 2 0 0 1 . 
(b) D o e s not include hotel's guests. 
(c) Includes barracks. 
(d) Source DAP-Ministero della Giustizia. 
(e) Source: Provincia di Torino, average numb. of guests in 2003. 
(£) Source: Caritas. 
(g) Source: IRES. 
4.3 Temporary residents 
2001 population census data were used to idendfy the non- resident population. This was the 
first Census that made information available concerning the number of non residents, the 
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reasons for their presence and the length of their stay. Therefore, we considered as residents 
anyone declaring the Commune as their usuai place of residence5. This allowed more precise 
informadon than the indirect esumate provided by Bernareggi (quot.). The esumate of the 
equivalent populadon is reported in table 4. 
Then we made use of the Census data on cohabitadon by category, combined with 
informadon from other sources. Table 5 shows the outcome in terms of equivalent populadon. 
Summing the data of the two tables gives the result of 40,191 equivalent inhabitants. We have 
not been able to include a precise esumate of the non-resident alien populadon for lack of 
informadon, although a rough esumate would amount to about 6,000. 
4.4 Dailiy non-resident population 
The esumate of the daily non-resident populadon drew on rough data collected for the 
biannual GTT survey which covers the endre populadon in Piedmont over the age of ten 
(more than 60,000). The main advantage of this survey over the ISTAT Census is that it 
includes informadon about the residence of the people surveyed allowing us to idendfy the 
daily non- resident populadon6. 
Through the ISTAT Census data one can determine the influx towards the centrai city for 
reasons of study or work alone analyzing the data from the individuai communes. The GTT 
survey instead offers the main advantages of simplicity and the greater level of detail 
concerning the reasons for commudng (shopping, sports, leisure activities, etc.), making it 
easier to idendfy which services of the centrai city are exploited by the non resident 
population. Table 6 reports the esdmated daily influx in terms of equivalent population equal 
to about 300,000 inhabitants. 
Table 6 - Daily movements of populadon 
Influx by reasons (2004) 
Interviem 
in Turin 
(mainly 
residents in 
Piemonte) 
Interviews 
outside 
Turin 
Total 
%of 
resident 
population 
Discounting 
factor 
Equivalent 
population 
Commuters to work (a) * 1 3 0 , 4 7 9 1 3 , 9 0 0 1 4 4 , 3 7 9 16 .6 0 . 7 4 9 1 0 8 , 1 4 0 
Work reasons ** 2 1 , 6 5 4 3 , 1 4 7 2 4 , 8 0 1 2 .9 0 . 7 4 9 1 8 , 5 7 6 
Study / commuting to school * 4 2 , 9 9 5 9 , 0 5 6 5 2 , 0 5 1 6 0 . 6 6 5 3 4 , 6 1 4 
Shopping / errands ** 53 ,371 1 , 619 5 4 , 9 9 0 6 . 3 0 . 9 5 6 5 2 , 5 7 0 
Drive / Pick-up persons** 13 ,561 4 0 4 1 3 , 9 6 5 1 .6 0 . 7 9 11 ,032 
Health visits ** 12 ,581 5 0 6 13 ,087 1 .5 0 . 7 4 9 9 , 802 
Sport / recreation ** 3 7 , 5 3 2 1 , 759 3 9 , 2 9 1 4 .5 1 . 056 4 1 , 4 9 1 
Visit relatives / friends ** 1 9 , 1 0 8 1 , 309 2 0 , 4 1 7 2 .4 1 2 0 , 4 1 7 
Other ** 5 ,228 5 2 2 5 , 7 5 0 0 . 7 0 . 7 5 5 4 , 3 4 1 
Total 3 3 6 , 5 0 9 3 2 , 2 2 2 3 6 8 , 7 3 1 4 2 . 5 3 0 0 , 9 8 3 
* Population identifìed as commuter. 
** Population defined as non-commuter. 
Source: GTT Torino, indagine sulla mobilità 2004. 
5 Although, according to the Census definitions, not ali these residents are included in the City register. 
6 The Census ISTAT data, instead, does not reveal this information, including data only for people commuting for 
reasons of study or work. 
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This survey allows us to distinguish the portion of the non resident daily population which 
regularly commute to the city for the purposes of work or study from those we can refer to as 
" the proximity population", who go to the city for reasons tied to the use of free time or 
domestic necessity. 
The data fails to provide a breakdown of: 
• what grade of school pupils are attending; 
• which locai public services are actually used by the proximity population (e.g.: facilities for 
sport and leisure, entertainment and shopping). 
Therefore, only an estmate of the share of costs related to the non resident population can be 
provided. 
4.5 Localpublic services 
After breaking down the non resident population into temporary and daily residents, the 
communal services benefiting each can be determined through the equivalency coefficients of 
locai public services. Most, although not ali, services are available to the non resident 
population. The literature provides two approaches to the assessment of the incidence of the 
benefits deriving from these services. The first one is based on the net unit cost of each public 
service and the intensity of its use. For instance, the individuai benefit of a museum visitor is 
given by the product of the cost of the single visit net of paid fees and the total number of 
visits over a certain period of time. The second approach is calculated by assessing the area 
under the demand curve for locai public goods, that is, the total consumer's surplus value. In 
other words, by assessing the total benefit deriving from the locai public good in terms of of 
willingness to pay, again net of any fee incurred. Although this second approach is 
undoubtedly sounder analytically, it is difficult to apply without conducting ad hoc surveys. 
Therefore, we generally make use of some variant of the first. 
In this study, we relied on an estimate of the share of non resident population, assuming that 
this is a rough indicator of the share of the use of the services. Therefore, we attributed the 
budget allocations for 2003, net of incoming fees, to the different populations according to 
their relative size. 
One group of services benefits only the resident population (Table 7), even though positive 
externalities in favour of non residents cannot be entirely ruled out. This group includes city 
registry and voting services, neighbourhood councils, kindergardens, and cemeteries, means 
tested social services only for residents, and public housing. 
Table 7 - Services for Resident Population 
Functions Services 
Total 
outlays* % 
% total net 
outlays 
Decentralization 94,200,919 19.6 4.4 
Public Records Office; Draft, Polis 
Registration Office 19,410,788 4 0.9 
Kindergarten 97,848,886 20.4 4.6 
Social welfare and other services 57,536,615 12 2.7 
Public Housing 31,343,592 6.5 1.5 
Welfare Institutions and Charities 153,521,971 32 7.2 
Cemetery 26,513,770 5.5 1.2 
480,376,542 100 22.5 
General Services, Management 
and Control 
Public Education 
Urban and Land Planning 
Social Welfare 
Total 
*Total of Capital Oudays, Salaries and Loans. 
Sources: Data processed by IRES using the officiai budget of the Commune of Torino, 2003. 
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Using these criteria, the expenses in favour of residents only amounted to 480 million euro, 
equivalent to 22.5% of total expenditures in 2003. 
Table 8 - Final Esumate of Oudays for PNR 
Outlays for Services used also by Non-Resident-Population 
Total Net Total Outlays for 
A) Generalpurposes Outlays PNR 
Functìon 3 78.099.009 9.232.193 
City Police 76.161.294 9.043.445 
Administrative Police 1.937.715 188.748 
Functìon 8 255.842.506 26.063.678 
Read Services and Traffic 146.749.402 17.425.126 
Parking -7.513.597 -1.282.137 
Street Lighting 30.012.275 3.633.379 
Public Transport* 87.103.615 6.287.310 
Airports (SAGAT) -509.189 n/a 
Functìon 9 101.428.738 9.875.183 
City and Land Planning 16.569.009 1.613.945 
Environment, Public Safety 543.993 52.989 
Water Supply** 2.288.829 n/a 
Refuse collection and Garbage Disposai (AMIAT)*** 7.708.433 969.077 
Parks, Public Space Designs 74.318.474 7.239.172 
Functìon 11 
Power and Gas (AEM Torino) -8626213 n/a 
Total Net Outlays 426744040 45171054 
B) Special Purposes Total Net Outlays 
Total Outlays for 
PNR 
Functìon 1 
Tribunals 38.382.939 1.228.886 
Functìon 3 
Market Police 2.467.371 152.033 
Functìon 4 
Education 65.811.551 2.816.191 
Functìon 5 
Recreational Services 121.670.492 8.197.744 
Functìon 6 
Swimming Pools 5.704.522 272.802 
Soccer Stadium and other sporting venues 53.804.491 2.573.041 
Fairs and Exhibitions 32.815.318 1.569.296 
Functìon 7 
Tourism 51.753.271 1.524.485 
Functìon 10 
Social Protection 202.482.418 4.689.872 
Functìon 11 
Economie Development 11.813.805 638.902 
Total Net Outlays 586.706.179 23.663.251 
Following Bernareggi's approach (2004b) we divided the services available to the non 
residents into two categories: those used by ali types of non residents and those used only by 
certain subsets. In the first group, we include ali expenses related to physical presence in a city, 
such as law and order, streets, transport, traffic control, public lighdng, environment, parks 
1 1 
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and public space design. The second category includes expenses for culture, education, sport, 
tourism and so on. Again, both categories must be calculated net of any fees paid by users, 
and, in the case of locai public corporations managing public Utilities, net of any other extra 
revenue (interest, dividends, concessions) the city receives from them. 
More precise informadon regarding the intensity of use would be especially valuable in order 
to evaluate the actual net impact of non residents. Table 8 reports the tentative results derived 
from applying the non resident population share to net locai expenditure. 
The second group of services was estimated to account for about 23 million euro (that is 11 
per cent of the total expenses of this type). To this is added 45 million euro related to the first 
group (those used by ali types of non residents), totalling 68 million euro (that is 4 per cent of 
the total expenses of this type). This represents 6.8 per cent of the total net communal 
expenses. It must be stressed that these values are significandy lower than those in Milano. 
They are likely to be underestimated for two reasons: first, 
because of missing categories of expenses and, second, because of lack of reliable data 
concerning the various components of the daily non resident population. Equally, the same 
applies to the temporary residents. For this reason we made recourse to a simplified 
assumption regarding the average length of residence. However, this does not account for the 
presence of unregistered aliens. Moreover, our estimadon has not taken into account several 
aother categories, such as nomadic populations and illegai immigrants, due to lack of data on 
related locai expenses. 
Overall therefore, our analysis is stili very tentative, especially compared to the similar study by 
Bernareggi (quot.) and needs to be supplemented by additional data from the complete GTT 
survey, census data and budget data from other locai agencies and locai public corporations 
managing public Utilities. 
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5. Conclusions 
This work analyses the influence of metropolitan development on centrai cities' finances. In 
pardcular, we tried to establish the extent to which the fiscal health of centrai cides was 
negadvely impacted in the various phases of urban development and to idendfy potendal 
analogies with the urban decline that typified the growth of some American cities. 
Generally speaking, even though Turin does not seem to demonstrate symptoms of urban 
decline, it is experiencing the increasing financial stress common to big cides in Italy owing to 
the new system of locai fìnance and centrai equalizadon transfers. 
Litde attendon has been devoted to analyses of fiscal needs of big cities related to the impact 
of the non resident populadons (Pommerehne and Krebs, 1991, Chernick and Tkacheva, 
2002). The rough calculation provided here, although it is clearly underesdmated, reveals that 
the impact on the centrai city's budget is indeed significant. Lacking a policy towards 
consolidation of the locai governments concerned, new horizontal equalizadon transfer 
schemes from higher levels of government might be recommended. 
Where excludable serices exist the most efficient solution is to apply user charges, such as 
commuter charges recently successfully used in London. From an institutional point of view this 
would require experimentation of new flexible forms of intergovernmental horizontal 
cooperadon. 
& 
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Appendix 
1 ) Calculatìon of the equivalerliy coefficients of the different categories ofpopulation 
To estimate the annual presence of the resident population we made use of the coeficient 
calculated by Bernareggi (2004b), equal to 0.947, assuming similar behaviour between the 
resident population of Milan and Turin. This coefficient allows absences for holidays and 
weekends to be taken into account so that comparison between the resident and the non 
resident population can be made homogeneously. The average annual presence indexes of the 
non resident population are therefore divided by this index. 
A different method was used to measure the number of temporary residents. We used the 
actual figures declared by individuals in the 2001 ISTAT Family census broken down into three 
periods (90 to 180 days, 181 to 270 and 271 to 365). Periods under 90 days were excluded 
from the study. It may be useful to highlight that Bernareggi used a different method by 
means of indirect indicators such as daily water consumption and refuse production. 
The median values of the first period (135 days), of the second (225 days) and of the third 
(318 days) were used as the index for the average annual presence for the five types of non 
resident populations residing in private lodgings. This is clearly a simplification which does 
calculate the exact periods of absence such as weekends, public holidays or vacation time and 
assumes instead that the median time spent by the non residents is evenly distributed over the 
entire declared period of residence. However, this method allowed to compare the non 
resident population with the resident population discounted by Bernareggi's coefficient. We 
thus use the coefficient of equivalence C representing the ratio between the coefficient of 
equivalence by type of population (c) - that is the per cent presence per year - and the overall 
coefficient of equivalence for the resident population. 
cì 
C 
' 0.947 
where i= types of population and j = period of residence 
This coefficient is used to estimate the equivalent population according to the criteria 
described below to calculate the expenses broken down by category in favour of the non 
resident population. Bernareggi's (2004b) coefficient was used in calculating cohabitation by 
category and daily population. However, we had the advantage of access to the preliminary 
data drawn from 2004 GlT survey on mobility in Turin. More detailed future analysis of the 
data may reveal significant differences in Milanese and Turinese commuters' habits, allowing 
us to make any appropriate adjustments to the coefficient of equivalence in Turin. 
2) Expenses for services used by ali types of non residents and for those used only by certain subsets. 
Estimation of the share of expenses in favour of the different types of population 
•Services used bv ali types of non residents 
To calculate expenses in favour of non resident daily populations for the first group of 
services, those related to each individuals' physical presence in a city, we used the proportion 
of daily trips made by the non resident daily populations to the total as an indicator of their 
consumption of locai public services according to the following criteria: 
Municipal police and road maintenance: percent of total daily trips made by non resident 
population 
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Parking: percent of total daily car trips made by non resident population 
Public Transport: percent of total daily trips on public transport made by non resident 
population 
Public lighting: percent of total daily trips during operadon of public lighdng made by non 
resident populadon 
Urban planning, environment, parks and public space design, emergency crews, 
refuse collection: propordon of temporary non resident population to the total population 
(resident and non resident). 
(*) due to lack of data temporay residents were not take in to account in these calculations 
Services used only by certain subsets of residents 
To calculate expenses in favour of non resident daily populations for the second group of 
services, instead we used Bernareggi's coefficient to determine the ratio of the presence of 
commuters to the presence of permanent and temporary residents (the latter equal to 1 and 
therefore the former equal to. 4). 
As for services used by only a subset of the population we calculated the ratio of daily 
commuters to the total number of commuters whose declared purpose can be direcdy linked 
to a particular service supplied by the municipality. The one exception was for the use of the 
courts. In this case we used the portion of daily population who declared "other" as their 
purpose for commuting. Services related to social sectors and migrant population and 
immigration have not been considered . 
Estimates of the ratio of temporary equivalent resident population (excluding prison inmates 
and migrants) to the total population were used to calculate expenses in favour of particular 
subgroups of the population. The only exception were social services and tourism. For the 
former we used only the share of temporary residents to the total, and for the latter we used 
Hotel registration data reported in the 2001 Census. To calculate expenses on education 
related to temporary residents we applied the share of temporary residents who declared their 
presence for the purpose of study or work in the 2001 Census. 
Whenever the purpose of non resident's presence cannot be attributed to a specific service 
because of lack of data the apportionment of the share of expenses was considered to be 
equal to their equivalent share of the total population (resident and non resident). 
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